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Abstract
A key fact in the theory of Boolean functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is that they often undergo
sharp thresholds. For example: if the function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is monotone and symmetric
under a transitive action with Ep[f ] = ǫ and Eq[f ] = 1 − ǫ then q − p → 0 as n → ∞. Here
Ep denotes the product probability measure on {0, 1}
n where each coordinate takes the value 1
independently with probability p.
The fact that symmetric functions undergo sharp thresholds is important in the study of
random graphs and constraint satisfaction problems as well as in social choice.
In this paper we prove sharp thresholds for monotone functions taking values in an arbitrary
finite sets. We also provide examples of applications of the results to social choice and to random
graph problems.
Among the applications is an analog for Condorcet’s jury theorem and an indeterminacy
result for a large class of social choice functions.
1 Introduction
1.1 Sharp thresholds
A key fact in the theory of Boolean functions is that monotone symmetric functions undergo sharp
thresholds. This fact has fundamental significance in the study of constraint satisfaction problems,
random graph processes and percolation and in social choice.
The results of [4] show that for every 0 < ǫ < 1/2 there exists a C > 0 such that for all n and
all f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} which is monotone and symmetric (see definitions below) if Ep[f ] = ǫ and
Eq[f ] = 1− ǫ then 0 < q− p < C(log n)
−1. This result implies in particular that “Every monotone
graph property has a sharp threshold” as [4] is titled. It also implies that symmetric voting systems
aggregate information well, see for example [5] and the examples provided in the current paper.
∗Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Yale University, and Microsoft, Israel. Supported by ISF, and NSF awards
†U.C. Berkeley and Weizmann Institute of Science. Supported by DMS 0548249 (CAREER) award, by DOD
ONR grant N0014-07-1-05-06, by ISF grant 1300/08 and by a Minerva Grant
1.2 Notation and Main Results
Let A be a finite set. LetX = An. For σ ∈ S(n), a permutation on n elements and x ∈ An we denote
by y = xσ the vector satisfying yi = xσ(i) for all i. For σ ∈ S(A) we write y = σ(x) for the vector
satisfying yi = σ(xi) for all i. For a ∈ A and x, y ∈ X we write x ≤a y if {i : xi = a} ⊂ {i : yi = a}
and for all i such that yi 6= a it holds that xi = yi. In other words if x ≤a y then for all i if xi 6= yi
then yi = a. It is easy to see that ≤a defines a partial order on X.
We say that f : X = An → A is monotone if for all a ∈ A and x, y ∈ X such that x ≤a y it
holds that f(x) = a implies that f(y) = a. We say that f is symmetric if there exists a transitive
group Σ ⊂ S(n) such that f(xσ) = f(x) for all x ∈ X and σ ∈ Σ. We say that f is fair if for all
σ ∈ S(A) and all x ∈ X it holds that f(σ(x)) = σ(f(x)).
Let ∆[A] denote the simplex of probability measures on A and let γ denote the standard prob-
ability measure on ∆[A]. For µ ∈ ∆[A] denote by Pµ the measure µ
⊗n on X. We denote by Eµ
the expected value according to the measure Pµ. For any measure µ ∈ ∆[A], we write µ
∗ for the
minimal probability µ assigns to any of the atoms in A.
In our main result we show that:
Theorem 1.1. There exists an absolute constant C = C(|A|) such that if f is symmetric and
monotone then for any a ∈ A and ǫ > 0 it holds that
γ[µ : ǫ ≤ Pµ[f = a] ≤ 1− ǫ] ≤ C(log(1− ǫ)− log(ǫ))
log log n
log n
.
The result above establishes sharp threshold for symmetric functions as it shows that for almost
all probability measures f takes one specific value with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Remark 1.2. It is interesting to compare the results established here to those of [4]. For |A| = 2
our results give a threshold interval of length O(log log n/ log n) compared to the results of [4] which
give threshold interval of length O(1/ log n). In the binary case the later result is tight. It is natural
to conjecture that the threshold is always of measure O(1/ log n).
1.2.1 Other applications
Various applications of the threshold result to problems involving distributions of edge colored
graphs are given in subsection 3.2.
1.3 Social choice background, and applications
We will describe two main applications of our main result to social choice theory. The first ap-
plication gives an extension of Condorcet’s Jury theorem for monotone choice functions for more
than two candidates and large classes of voting rules. The second application is to indeterminacy
results for generalized social choice functions.
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1.3.1 Aggregation of Information
The law of large numbers implies that in an election between two candidates denoted 0 and 1, if
every voter votes for 0 with probability p > 1/2 and for 1 with probability 1− p and if these votes
are independent, then as the number of voters tends to infinity the probability that 0 will be elected
tends to one. This fact is referred to as Condorcet’s Jury Theorem.
This theorem can be interpreted as saying that even if agents receive very poor but independent
signals indicating which decision is correct, majority voting will nevertheless result in the correct
decision being taken with a high probability if there are enough agents (and each agent votes
according to the signal he receives). This phenomenon is referred to as asymptotically complete
aggregation of information and it plays an important role in theoretical economics.
More recent results studied aggregation of information for general symmetric fair functions
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Recall that such a function is fair if f(1− x1, . . . , 1− xn) = 1− f(x1, . . . , xn).
In this setup the results of [4] imply that for every p > 1/2 and every symmetric fair function on
n voters it holds Ep[f ] > 1− o(1).
Here we derive a similar result in the case of an election between [q] candidates. Note that the
conditions of monotonicity and fairness are both natural in this setup.
• Monotonicity implies that if in a certain vector x ∈ [q]n of voters a certain candidate i is
elected and if y is identical to x except that some of the voters changed their mind as to vote
i, then the outcome of the vote for y should also be i.
• Fairness means that all the candidates are treated equally.
Theorem 1.3. For every q there exists a constant C = C(q) for which the following holds for every
ǫ < 1/3. Let µ ∈ ∆(q) and i ∈ [q] satisfy that
µ(i) > max
j 6=i
µ(j) +C(log(1− ǫ)− log(1/q))
log log n
log n
.
Then for every fair monotone function f : [q]n → [q] it holds that
µ[f = i] ≥ 1− ǫ.
In words - the proposition claims that for any measure on the votes that has a log log n/ log n
bias towards one of the candidates i and any fair monotone voting function it holds that i will be
elected with high probability. The proof is given in subsection 3.1.
1.3.2 Indeterminacy
Arrow’s impossibility theorem asserts that under certain natural conditions, if there are at least
three alternatives then every non-dictatorial social choice gives rise to a non-rational choice function,
i.e., there exist profiles such that the social choice is not rational. Arrow’s theorem can be seen
in the context of Condorcet’s “paradox” which demonstrates that the majority rule may result
in the society preferring A over B , B over C and C over A. Arrow’s theorem shows that such
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“paradoxes” cannot be avoided with any non-dictatorial voting method. It is the general form
of Arrow’s theorem, which can be applied to general schemes for aggregating individual rational
choices, that made it so important in economic theory.
McGarvey [7] appears to have been the first to show that for every asymmetric relation R on a
finite set of candidates there is a strict-preferences (linear orders, no ties) voter profile that has the
relation R as its strict simple majority relation. This implies that we cannot deduce the society’s
choice between two candidates even if we know the society’s choice between every other pair of
candidates. We refer to this phenomena as “complete indeterminacy”.
Saari [9] proved that the plurality method gives rise to every choice function for sufficiently
large societies. (In fact, he proved more: the ranking on any subset of the alternatives can be
prescribed). This implies that knowing the outcome of the plurality choice for several examples,
where each example consists of a set S of alternatives and the chosen element c(S) for S, cannot
teach us anything about the outcome for a set of alternatives which is not among the examples we
have already seen.
In [5] McGarvey’s theorem is extended to sequences of neutral social welfare functions in which
the maximum Shapley-Shubik power index tends to 0. The proof relied on threshold properties of
Boolean functions. In particular, McGarvey’s theorem extends to neutral social welfare functions
which are invariant under a transitive group of permutations of the individuals. We describe a
similar extension of Saari’s theorem.
2 Proof of the main theorem
The proof follows the same simple idea used in [4]. That is, we use information on the influences
in order to deduce that Eµ[f ] varies quickly as a function of µ. We thus derive a generalization of
Russo’s formula [6, 8] which expresses derivatives in terms of influences. We then use the fact that
functions taking only a bounded number of values must have large influence sums.
Depending on the type of influence sum bounds, one obtain different results. Using the results
of [1] it is possible to obtain a bound on the threshold interval length of order O(log1/3 n).Here
we derive the better bound of order O(log log n/ log n) using a generalization of the results of
Talagrand [10]. This generalization was proven in a course taught by the second author on Fall
2005. A draft of the proof was written in scribe notes of the course by Asaf Nachmias at
http : //www.stat.berkeley.edu/ ∼ mossel/teach/206af05/scribes/oct25.pdf . For completeness
we have corrected and completed the proof.
It seems like in order to obtain a threshold bound of O(1/ log n) it would be needed to derive a
tighter influence sum bound tailored to the setup here.
From now on, without loss of generality assume A = [q] = {0, 1 . . . , q − 1}. We will consider
functions f : [q]n → {0, 1} and say that such a function is 0-monotone if x ≤0 y implies that
f(x) ≤ f(y).
Clearly in order to prove Theorem 1.1, it suffices to prove that there exists C > 0 such that if
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f is symmetric and 0-monotone then for all ǫ > 0 it holds that
γ[µ : ǫ ≤ Pµ[f = 0] ≤ 1− ǫ] ≤ C(log(1− ǫ)− log(ǫ))
log log n
log n
. (1)
2.1 Influences
We will use the L2 influence
Let f : X → R.
Let Iiµ(f), the i’th influence of f according to µ ∈ ∆[A] by
Iiµ(f) = Eµ[Var[f |x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn]]
In Corollary 5.7 we will derive the following lower bound on influence sum which is a consequence
of a generalization of a result of Talagrand [10]. We restate the corollary here:
Corollary 2.1. There exists some universal constant C such that for any probability space (Ω, µ)
and any function f : Ωn → {0, 1} which is symmetric it holds that it holds that
n∑
i=1
Ii(f) ≥
C
log(1/α)
log nVar(f).
2.2 Russo Type Formula
We denote by T (∆) the tangent space to Σ(∆). The space is easily identified with the space of all
vectors in t ∈ RA satisfying
∑
ti = 0. The natural derivative on T (∆) satisfies ∂Pµ[f ]/∂t ∈ T (∆).
Lemma 2.2. Let f : [q] → {0, 1} be a 0-monotone function and µ a measure on [q] and suppose
that f is 0-monotone. Write µ = (1 − µ(0))µ′ + µ(0)δ0 where µ
′(0) = 0 and µ′ is a probability
measure. Let t = δ0 − µ
′ ∈ T (∆). Then
∂Eµ+ht[f ]
∂h
= 1(f is not constant)µ′[1− f ] ≥ Varµ′ [f ].
Proof. By linearity the derivative equals f(0)− µ′[f ]. The last expression is 0 when f is constant.
If f is not constant then by monotonicity it holds that f(0) = 1 and therefore the derivative is
1 − µ′[f ] as needed. Finally, the inequality follows from the fact that if f is constant then the
variance is 0 and otherwise µ′[1− f ] ≥ µ′[f ]µ′[1− f ] = Varµ′ [f ].
We now prove a generalization of Russo’s formula.
Lemma 2.3. Let f : [q]n → {0, 1} be a 0-monotone function and µ ∈ ∆[q]. Write µ = (1 −
µ(0))µ′ + µ(0)δ0 where µ
′(0) = 0 and µ′ is a probability measure. Let t = δ0 − µ
′ ∈ T (∆). Then:
∂Eµ+ht[f ]
∂h |h=0
=
n∑
i=1
Eµ
[
1([f |Fi] is not constant )Eµ′ [1− f |Fi]
]
≥
n∑
i=1
Iiµ′(f),
where Fi denotes conditioning on x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn.
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Proof. Use the chain rule:
∂Eµ+ht[f ]
∂h |h=0
=
∂(µ + ht)⊗n[f ]
∂h |h=0
=
n∑
i=1
∂ ⊗nj=1 (µ + hjt)[f ]
∂hi |(h1,...,hn)=0
and Lemma 2.2.
2.3 Proof of the Main Result
We now prove the main result, i.e., (1). In the proof below the constants c will denote different
constant at different lines. All of them depend on q only.
Proof. Let Γ denote the set of measures µ in ∆[q] satisfying the following:
• µ[0] = 0.
• µ[i] ≥ η for all i 6= 0.
Write µt = tδ0 + (1− t)µ and note that
γ[µt : 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, µ /∈ Γ] ≤ C(q)η. (2)
For each measure µ ∈ Γ we look at the interval J ǫ,1−ǫµ , where
J ǫ,1−ǫµ = {t ∈ Iµ : ǫ ≤ Pµt [f ] ≤ 1− ǫ}.
Our goal is to show that the interval J ǫ,1−ǫµ is short by bounding the derivative of
G(t) = µt[f ]
in the interval. In fact we will bound the length of each of the sub-intervals J
ǫ,1/2
µ and J
1/2,1−ǫ
µ .
Since f is 0, 1 valued, it follows that in the interval J
ǫ,1/2
µ it holds that Varµt [f ] ≥
1
2µ
t[f ]. By
Lemma 2.3 and Proposition 2.1 we conclude that:
G′(t) ≥
n∑
i=1
Iiµt(f) ≥
c log n
log(1/η)
Varµ[f ] ≥
c log n
2 log(1/η)
G(t).
This implies that:
(lnG)′(t) ≥
c log n
log(1/η)
.
In particular if G(p) = ǫ and G(q) = 1/2 then:
ln(1/2) − ln(ǫ) ≥
c|p − q| log n
log(1/η)
.
So:
|p− q| ≤
(ln(1/2) − ln(ǫ)) log(1/η)
c log n
.
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Repeating the same argument for the interval (1/2, 1 − ǫ) we obtain that
|J ǫ,1−ǫµ | ≤
(ln(1− ǫ)− ln(ǫ)) log(1/η)
c log n
.
Which together (2) with implies that
γ[µ : ǫ ≤ Pµ[f = 0] ≤ 1− ǫ] ≤ C(q)
(
η +
(ln(1− ǫ)− ln(ǫ)) log(1/η)
log n
)
.
Taking η = (ln(1− ǫ)− ln(ǫ))/ log n we obtain the bound:
C(q)
(
ln(1− ǫ)− ln(ǫ)
log n
+ (ln(1 − ǫ)− ln(ǫ))
log log n
log n
)
≤ 2C(q) ((ln(1− ǫ)− ln(ǫ))
log log n
log n
as needed.
3 Applications
3.1 A general form of Condorcet’s Jury theorem
We begin with a proof of Theorem 1.3. Since the proof is similar to the previous proof, we only
sketch the main steps.
Proof. We only sketch the proof since it is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.1. Assume first that
µ(j) > 1logn for all j. Let µ = t
∗δi + (1 − t
∗)µ′ where µ′ is a probability measure with µ′(i) = 0.
As before write µt = tδi + (1− t)µ
′ for every t. Let s < t∗ be chosen so that µs(i) = maxj 6=i µ
s(j).
From symmetry and monotonicity it follows that
µs[f = i] ≥ 1/q.
Moreover, the argument in Theorem 1.1 shows that for t in the interval (s, t∗) it holds that
∂µt+h[f = i]
∂h |h=0
≥ Cµt[f = i](1 − µt[f = i])
log log n
log n
,
which implies that
|t∗ − s| ≤ C(log(1− ǫ)− log(1/q))
log log n
log n
,
thus proving the statement of the theorem.
It remains to remove the assumption that µ(j) > 1logn for all j. The general case where some
of the probabilities µ(i) may satisfy µ(i) < 1logn requires one additional step at the cost of taking
the constant C to be C ′ = C + (q − 1). Instead of the measure µ we first consider the measure µˆ
where µˆ(j) = µ(j) + 1/ log n for j 6= i and µˆ(i) = µ(i)− (q − 1)/ log n.
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Note that if µ satisfies the conditions of the theorem with the constant C ′ then µˆ satisfies it
with the constant C. Moreover µˆ(j) > 1/ log n for all j. Therefore by the first part of the proof
µˆ[f = i] ≥ 1− ǫ.
On the other hand, by monotonicity we have
µ[f = i] ≥ µˆ[f = i],
which implies the desired result.
3.2 Graph properties
Consider a process on the edges of the complete graph Kn where each edge e = {a, b} is labeled
by i with probability µ(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q independently for different edges. This process defines
sets E1, . . . , Eq where Ei is the set of edges labeled by i. In other words, it defines q graphs
([n], E1), . . . , ([n], Eq).
Definition 3.1. A function A from the set of partitions of the edges of Kn to q parts into [q] is
called a graph property if: For all partitions E1, . . . , Eq and all permutations σ ∈ S(n) it holds that
A(E1, . . . , Eq) = A(σ(E1), . . . , σ(Eq)),
where σ(Ei) = {{σ(u), σ(v)} : {u, v} ∈ Ei}.
The function A is called a monotone graph property if
• For every pair of partitions (E1, . . . , Eq) and (F1, . . . , Fq)
• and all 1 ≤ i ≤ q it holds that
If:
• Ei ⊆ Fi and
• Fj ⊆ Ej for j 6= i and
• A(E1, . . . , Eq) = i,
Then A(F1, . . . , Fq) = i.
Here are a few examples:
• Given a graph labeled by [q], let A(E1, . . . , Eq) = i, where i is the minimal index for which |Ei|
is maximal. In other words, i is the most popular label, where ties are decided by preferring
the smaller index.
• Given a graph labeled by [q] let A(E1, . . . , Eq) = i where Ei has the largest clique. Again ties
are decided by preferring the smaller index.
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• Given a graph labeled by [q] let A(E1, . . . , Eq) = i where Ei has the smallest independent set
of vertices. Again ties are decided by preferring the smaller index.
Theorem 1.1 implies the following:
Corollary 3.2. There exists a constant C = C(q) such that for every monotone graph property it
holds that
γ[µ : ǫ ≤ Pµ[A = i] ≤ 1− ǫ] ≤ C(log(1− ǫ)− log(ǫ))
log log n
log n
.
4 Indeterminacy for voting methods
4.1 The setting
Let P+(X) denote the family of non-empty subsets of X.
Definition 4.1. Given a set X of m alternatives, a choice function c is a mapping which assigns to
each nonempty subset S of X an element c(S) ∈ S. A choice function is thus a map c : P+(X)→ X
with the additional property that c(S) ∈ S for all S ∈ P+(X).
A choice function is called rational if there is a linear ordering on the alternatives such that c(S)
is the maximal element of S according to that ordering.
A social choice function is a map
of the form c = F (c1, c2, . . . , cn) where c is a choice function on X which depends on the profile
of individual rational choice functions c1, c2, . . . cn for the individuals.
Note that there are two different meanings for the term “social choice functions”. Sometimes a
social choice function is referred to as a map which associates to the profile of rational individual
choices (or preferences) a single “winner” for the society. A social choice function in this sense
easily defines a social choice function in our sense by restricting to a subset of alternatives. We
can regard social choice functions as election rules which given a set S of candidates and (strict)
preference relations of the individuals on the candidates, provides a rule for choosing the winner.
We regard X as the set of all possible candidates, and S as the set of available candidates, and we
are interested to understand the society’s choice as a function of S.
The axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Arrow’s IIA) asserts that c(A) may
depend only on the preference relations restricted to the set A.
We require the stronger property Independence of Rejected Alternatives (IRA), also referred to
as Nash’s IIA.
(IRA) (Independence of Rejected Alternative (IRA)) c(S) is a function of (c1(S), c2(S), . . . cn(S))
Therefore we can write c(S) = FS(c1(S), c2(S), . . . cm(S)).
We will require a few more conditions:
(P) (Pareto) c(S) ∈ {c1(S), c2(S), . . . , cn(S)}.
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4.2 Further assumptions
We will make the following additional assumptions:
(U) (Unrestricted domains) The social choice function is defined for arbitrary rational profiles of
the individuals.
(N1’) (Neutrality) The social choice is invariant under permutations of the alternatives.
(A2’) (Weak anonymity) The social choice is invariant under a transitive group of permutations of
the individuals.
(M’) (Monotonicity) The function c(S) is monotone in the following sense: If c(S) = s and ci(S) = t
for t 6= s then changing the choice of the i-th individual from t to s will not change c(S).
4.3 The result
Theorem 4.1. Let c0 be an arbitrary choice function on P+(X) where X is a set of m alternatives
and let δ < 1.
Then there is a probability distribution ν = ν(c0) on the space of orderings of the alternatives
and a number N = N(δ,m) such that the following holds for every social choice function F which
satisfies conditions (IRA) (P) (U’) (N1’), (A2’) and (M’):
If the number of individuals n is larger than N and if every individual makes the choice randomly
and independently according to ν, then with probability at least δ for all S ∈ P+(X) it holds that
c = F (c1, ..., cn) satisfies c(S) = c0(S) with probability of at least δ (here ci(S) is the highest ranked
alternative in the order of voter i).
Corollary 4.2. There exists N = N(m) such that when the number n of individuals is larger than
N(m), every choice function c on P+(X), where X is a set of m alternatives, can be written as
c = F (c1, . . . , cn) for every social choice function F satisfies conditions (IRA), (P), (U’) (N1’),
(A2’) and (M’) applied to c1, . . . , cn that are determined by rankings.
4.4 The proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Let c0 be an arbitrary choice function and consider a profile with n0 individuals such that
the plurality leads to c0. Such a profile exists by Saari’s theorem.
For an ordering π of the alternatives let w′(π) be the number of appearances of the order π and
let w(π) = w′(π)/n0.
Consider a random profile (c1, . . . , cn) on n individuals where for each individual i the probability
that i-th preference relation ci is described by π is w(π) (independently for the individuals).
We will show that for all δ′ < 1 if n = n(δ′) is sufficiently large, then for S ⊂ X it holds with
probability at least δ′ that c(S) = FS(c1(S), . . . , cn(S)) satisfies c(S) = c0(S) with probability at
least δ′. This implies the required result by taking 1− δ′ ≤ 2−m(1− δ).
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To establish the claim above note that c1(S), . . . , cn(S) are i.i.d. and that for all a 6= c0(S) it
holds that P [ci(S) = c0(S)] ≥ P [ci(S) = a] + n
−1
0 . Furthermore the function FS as a functions of
c1(S), . . . , cn(S) satisfies neutrality and weak anonymity. Thus from Theorem 1.3 it follows that
for n large enough the probability that FS(c1(S), . . . , cn(S)) = c0(S) is at least 1− δ
′ as needed.
Note that the proof actually implies the following in the spirit of a theorem by Dasgupta and
Maskin [2].
Corollary 4.3. There exists N = N(m) > 0 with the following property: Let U be a set of linear
orders on m alternatives. If for the plurality rule there is a profile restricted to U which leads to
a choice function c for the society, then when n > N(m) this is the case for every social choice
function which satisfies conditions (IRA), (P), (N1’), (A2’) and (M’).
4.5 Taking rejected alternatives into account
We now describe a crucial example suggested by Bezalel Peleg. First, we note how we can base
on choices on pairs a choice correspondence: Given an asymmetric binary relation R on the set of
alternatives let c(S) be the set of elements y of S such that the number of z ∈ S such that yRz is
maximal. In other words, when we consider the directed graph described by the relation we choose
the vertex of maximal out-degree.
Let R denote the class of rational choice functions and B denote the class of choice correspon-
dences obtained from binary relations R as just described. Consider also the class B′ of choice
functions obtained from B by choosing a single element in c(S) according to some fixed order
relation on the alternatives. The number of choice functions in B′ and the number of choice corre-
spondences in B is exponential in
(
n
2
)
.
Now describe a social choice function as follows: aRb if a majority of the society prefers a to b.
In this case the social choice of S does not depend solely on the individual choices for S but
also on the preferences among pairs of elements in S.
When the individual choices are rational then the social choice still belongs to the class B (or
B′). In this case the choice from S is simply those elements of S which are Condorcet winners
against the maximal number of other elements in S. In this example the social choice for a set S
is typically large but this apparently be corrected by various methods of “tie breaking”.
In these examples the size of the resulting classes of choice functions is exponential in a quadratic
function of m2. It is much smaller than the number of all choice functions which is double expo-
nential in m.
The Borda rule can be analyzed by a similar consideration.For this rule c(A) is determined as
follows: For each alternative a ∈ A let ri(a) be the number of individuals who ranked a in the ith
place (among the elements of A). Let r(a) =
∑
i · ri(a). The chosen element by the society c(A)
is the element of a with the minimal weight.
Another way to describe the Borda rule is as follows: First construct a directed graph (with
multiple edges) with A as the set of vertices by introducing an edge from a to b for every individual
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that prefers a to b. Next, define (as before) c(A) as the vertex with maximal outdegree.
It is easy to prove that the number of choice functions that arise in this way is at most exponential
in m3. (The choice function can be recovered from the sign patters of (less than) 2m ·m2 linear
expressions in m2 real variables.
To summarize, the size of classes of choice functions that arise from a social choice function such
that c(S) may depend on the individual preferences of the elements of S is at least exponential in
m2 and this bound is sharp.
5 A generalization of Talagrand’s result
In this section we prove the bounds on L2 influence sums for arbitrary probability spaces. For this
we first recall the notion of Efron-Stein decomposition [3] then generalize Talagrand’s result [10]
and finally derive corollaries for {0, 1}-valued and symmetric functions.
5.1 Efron-Stein decomposition
Consider finite probability spaces Ω1, . . . ,Ωn, with measures µ1, . . . , µn. Let αi be size of the
smallest atom of (Ωi, µi), and set α = mini αi. Let f ∈ L
2(
∏
i µi) be a real valued function. Write
f =
∑
S⊂[n] fS for the Efron-Stein decomposition of f which we now recall.
Definition 5.1. Let (Ω1, µ1), . . . , (Ωn, µn) be discrete probability spaces (Ω, µ) =
∏n
i=1(Ωi, µi).
The Efron-Stein decomposition of f : Ω→ R is given by
f(x) =
∑
S⊆[n]
fS(xS), (3)
where the functions fS satisfy:
• fS depends only on xS .
• For all S 6⊆ S′ and all xS′ it holds that:
E[fS |XS′ = xS′ ] = 0.
It is well known that the Efron-Stein decomposition exists and that it is unique [3]. We quickly
recall the proof of existence. The function fS is given by:
fS(x) =
∑
S′⊆S
(−1)|S\S
′|E[f(X)|XS′ = xS′ ]
which implies
∑
S
fS(x) =
∑
S′
E[f |XS′ = x]
∑
S:S′⊆S
(−1)|S\S
′| = E[f |X[n] = x[n]] = f(x).
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Moreover, for S 6⊆ S′ we have E[fS|XS′ = xS′ ] = E[fS|XS′∩S = xS′∩S ] and for S
′ that is a strict
subset of S we have:
E[fS|XS′ = xS′ ] =
∑
S′′⊂S
(−1)|S\S
′′|E[f(X)|XS′′∩S′ = xS′′∩S′ ]
=
∑
S′′⊂S′
E[f(X)|XS′′ = xS′′ ]
∑
S′′⊂S˜⊂S′′∪(S\S′)
(−1)|S\S˜| = 0.
5.2 Generalization of a Result of Talagrand
We now prove:
Theorem 5.2 (Generalization of Talagrand, 1994). There exists some universal constant C such
that for any probability spaces (Ω, µ) and any function f ∈ L2(Ωn, µn) it holds that
Var(f) ≤ C log(1/µ∗)
∑
i≤n
||∆if ||
2
2
log
(
||∆if ||2/||∆if ||1
) .
where ∆if =
∑
S:i∈S fS.
The proof is almost identical to Talagrand’s proof using Efron-Stein decomposition instead of
Fourier expansion and known bounds on the hyper-contractive constants of finite probability spaces.
In particular we’ll use the following result of Wolff [11]:
Theorem 5.3. For g : Ωn → R, let:
TΘg =
∑
S
Θ|S|gS ,
Then for all g it holds that:
‖Tσg‖2 ≤ ‖g‖3/2,
for all
σ ≤
( (1− α)2−4/3 − α2−4/3
(1− α)α1−4/3 − α(1 − α)1−4/3
)1/2
.
.
Remark 5.4. In particular one may take σ = α2/6.
Proof. Let
f(x) = x2/3, g(x) = −(1− x)/x1/3.
By Lagrange’s theorem we may take:
σ2 =
f ′(ξ1)
g′(ξ2)
,
for some ξ1, ξ2 ∈ (α, 1 − α). Clearly
f ′(x) = (2/3)x−1/3, g′(x) = (2/3)x−1/3 + (1/3)x−4/3,
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are decreasing, and therefore
σ2 ≥
f ′(1− α)
g′(α)
=
2(1− α)−1/3
2α−1/3 + α−4/3
≥
2
3α−4/3
≥
α2
6
.
We now prove Theorem 2.1.
Proof. For a real function g from our space, denote
M2(g) =
∑
S 6=∅
‖gS‖
2
2
|S|
.
So
Var[f ] =
∑
S 6=∅
‖fS‖
2
2 =
n∑
i=1
M2(∆if) .
Note that the statement of the theorem follows if we prove that for any function g with Eg = 0,
M2(g) ≤ K log(1/α)
||g||22
log
(
||g||2/||g||1
) . (4)
The statement of the theorem follows by apply (4) to ∆if and summing the inequalities. To prove
(4) we use hypercontractivity. The following proposition is proved in the end of this note.
Applying Theorem 5.3 gives that for any integer k > 0,
σ2k
∑
0<|S|=k
‖gS‖
2
2 ≤
∑
S
σ2|S|‖gS‖
2
2 = ||Tσg||
2
2 ≤ ||g||
2
3/2 ,
hence ∑
|S|=k
‖gS‖
2
2 ≤
( 6
α2
)k
||g||23/2 .
Fix an integer m > 0, and sum the previous inequality for all k ≤ m to get
∑
|S|≤m
‖gS‖
2
2
|S|
≤
∑
k≤m
(
6
α2
)k
k
||g||23/2 ≤
2
(
6
α2
)m
m
||g||23/2 ,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that the ratio between two consecutive summands in
the sum is greater than 2. We now have
M2(g) =
∑
|S|≤m
‖gS‖
2
2
|S|
+
∑
|S|>m
‖gS‖
2
2
|S|
≤
2
(
6
α2
)m
m
||g||23/2 +
||g||22
m
≤
2
m
[( 6
α2
)m
||g||23/2 + ||g||
2
2
]
. (5)
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We now choose optimal m. Choose largest m such that
(
6
α2
)m
||g||23/2 ≤ ||g||
2
2, hence
( 6
α2
)m+1
||g||23/2 ≥ ||g||
2
2 =⇒ m+ 1 ≥
2 log
(
||g||2/||g||3/2
)
log(6/α2)
.
Plugging this back into (5) gives
M2(g) ≤ C
log(6/α2)||g||22
log
(
||g||2/||g||3/2
) .
An application of Cauchy-Schwartz gives
||g||33/2 ≤ ||g||1||g||
2
2 ,
hence ( ||g||3/2
||g||2
)3
≤
||g||1
||g||2
,
which concludes the proof of (4) and so we are done.
5.3 The formula for {0, 1} valued functions
For {0, 1} valued functions, Theorem 2.1 has a very simple formulation.
Lemma 5.5. Let f :
∏n
i=1Ωi → {0, 1}. Then
‖∆if‖1 = 2Ii(f).
Proof. Let f : [q]→ {0, 1} be a function with E[f ] = p. Note that
E[|f − p|] = p(1− p) + (1− p)p = 2Var[f ].
Since
∆if = f −E[f |X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn],
we see that
E[|∆i(f)||X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn] = 2Var[∆i|X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1,Xn],
and therefore taking expected value of X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1,Xn we obtain that
‖∆if‖1 = 2Ii(f).
We now obtain the following corollaries
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Corollary 5.6. There exists some universal constant C such that for any probability spaces (Ω, µ),
and any function f : Ωn → {0, 1} it holds that
Varµ(f) ≤ C log(1/µ
∗)
n∑
i=1
Ii(f)
log(1/2) − log(Ii)/2
.
In particular if Ii(f) ≤ δ for all i then:
n∑
i=1
Ii(f) ≥
1
2C log(1/µ∗)
(log(1/δ) − log(1/4))Varµ(f).
Corollary 5.7. There exists some universal constant C such that for any probability space (Ω, µ)
and any function f : Ωn → {0, 1} which is symmetric it holds that it holds that
n∑
i=1
Ii(f) ≥
C
log(1/α)
log nVarµ(f).
Proof. If Ii ≥
logn
100n the claim follows immediately. Otherwise we apply the previous corollary and
note that log(1/δ) = Ω(log n).
Remark 5.8. It is a fundamental question both for the Boolean case and for the case of larger
alphabet that we consider here to find conditions (and even appropriate definitions) for sharp
thresholds for monotone functions. One may want to obtain similar result on the basis of the fact
that the function f has low influences. However, this condition on its own does not suffice. Let
m : {−1, 1}2n → {−1, 1} be the majority function defined as follows:
mn(x) = sign(
2n∑
i=1
xi).
When the sum is 0 the function is defined arbitrarily in such a way that it is −1 on half of the
balanced inputs and 1 on the other half. We write vectors (x, y) ∈ {−1, 1}2n where x and y are
two vectors of length n. Let fn = m(x,−y). Then clearly all of f influences are of order at most
n−1/2. On the other hand, it is easy to see that limn→∞Ep(n)[f ] = 0 for all functions p(n) satisfying
limn→∞ np(n) = 0 and limn→∞ n(1− p(n)) = 0.
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